SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW

In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses
of recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing,
we hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of
the more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE-

REMEDIES-PENALTY PROVISIONS

OF MEDICAID FRAUD STATUTE ARE CIVIL REMEDIES, THUS CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST

Ex Post Facto

LAWS,

Do
PLY-In re Garay, 89 N.J. 104, 444 A.2d 1107 (1982).
JEOPARDY, AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL

PUNISHMENT

DOUBLE
NOT

Ap-

Between 1970 and 1973 Dr. Ramon Garay filed fifty-eight false
Medicaid claims amounting to $1290.20, for which he was indicted
and found guilty of nineteen counts of Medicaid fraud and one count
of obstruction of justice. At the time of commission the offenses were
misdemeanors. 89 N.J. at 108, 444 A.2d at 1109. Although he received
nineteen concurrent jail terms of eighteen months and a $500 fine on
each count, he was required only to pay the fine and serve three years
probation. Id. at 109, 444 A.2d at 1109. In addition, his medical
license was revoked by the State Board of Medical Examiners. After
Garay's conviction, the State Division of Medical Assistance and
Health Services (Division) began proceedings under N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:4D-17(e) (West 1981) for the recovery of $121,603.41 in civil penalties including the amount of the excess payment, interest on the
overpayment, treble damages, and $2000 per false claim. These penalties were made available by a 1976 amendment to the Medicaid
statute, hence after commission of the fraud. Id. at 109-10, 444 A.2d
at 1109-10. Garay argued that retroactive application of these penalties would violate the ex post facto law prohibitions in the United
States and New Jersey Constitutions. He contended further that imposing these penalties after his criminal trial would violate the double
jeopardy clauses of both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Garay urged, moreover, that the excessive penalty of
$121,603.41 would be cruel and unusual punishment and that the
Division's statutory penalties would violate due process as they would
be fundamentally unfair as applied to him. Id. at 107-08, 444 A.2d at
1109.
Declining to rule on the constitutional issues raised and deciding
the case on stipulated facts, the Director of the Division of Medical
Assistance and Health Services found Garay to owe the entire
$121,603.41 plus interest. Id. at 110, 444 A.2d at 1110. Nevertheless,
the appellate division reversed the Director's decision with regard to
the penalty of $2000 per fraudulent claim, finding it "harsh and
oppressive" and "fundamentally unfair," given that the penalty imposed was nearly 100 times the actual amount taken. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted cross-petitions for certification as the state
challenged the appellate division's decision to void the $116,000 penalty and Garay reasserted his constitutional claims of ex post facto
law, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment.
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The supreme court held that the constitutional protections
against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual
punishment were inapplicable because the penalty provisions of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-17(e) are civil remedies rather than criminal
penalties. Id. at 111, 444 A.2d at 1110. Writing for the court, Justice
Pashman noted that although the statute describes the penalties as
"civil penalties," a statute may be "so punitive either in purpose or
effect," id. at 111-12, 444 A.2d at 1111, as to be considered a criminal
statute for constitutional purposes. Relying on the inquiry set forth in
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), to decide whether a
penalty is civil or criminal, the court noted that when the legislature
has characterized a penalty as civil, only "the clearest proof" of a
punitive purpose or effect will induce the court to find that penalty
criminal. Id. at 248-49. In this connection, the court distinguished
between penalties which affect the status of a person, such as forfeiture of citizenship and those which are merely monetary. 89 N.J. at
112, 444 A.2d at 1111. In finding the latter type of penalty civil, the
court pointed out that not only have monetary penalties been established in many states, but also that courts have consistently found
them to be civil, as they serve the legitimate purpose of providing the
state with liquidated damages for the cost of fraud investigations and
legal proceedings. Id. at 113-14, 444 A.2d at 1112. The court further
noted that the legislature may set a reasonable sum to be recovered
and the state need not prove actual cost. In view of these considerations, the court declined to hold the penalty set by statute so excessive
as to render the remedy criminal. Id. at 114, 444 A.2d at 1112.
While acknowledging that the penalty must be tested for reasonableness under the specific circumstances, the court noted that it need
not address Garay's due process arguments, as did the appellate division, since the Director has discretion to seek less than the maximum
penalty under the 1980 amendment to the Act. Finding that he failed
to use such discretion by automatically imposing the maximum penalty, the court remanded the case to him to arrive at a reasonable
sum. Id. at 115, 444 A.2d at 1112-13. With regard to the automatic
imposition of the maximum penalty, the court recognized that the
great difference between the amount of money taken and the penalty
sought, virtually $100 in penalties for each dollar taken, may exceed
the state's interest in compensation and thus be unreasonable. Id. at
115-16, 444 A.2d at 1113. In addition, while acknowledging that no
exact formula exists to determine the proper penalty, the court suggested a number of factors for the Director to consider, including the
amount fraudulently taken, the state costs associated with Medicaid
fraud, and the nature of the fraudulent conduct. Id. at 116-17, 444
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A.2d at 1113-14. The court stressed, however, that the Director's
ultimate decision would not be reversed unless he abused his discretion. Id. at 117, 444 A.2d at 1114.
The Garay court, in reversing the appellate division judgment
and remanding the case to the Director of the Division of Medical
Assistance and Health Services with guidelines for a new penalty, has
sidestepped the due process issue inherent in the Director's initial
ruling. The existence of the 1980 amendment appears critical to the
court's action here. Furthermore, by finding the penalty provisions to
be civil rather than criminal, the court not only avoided Garay's
constitutional challenges, but also strengthened the position that all
penalties imposing monetary sanctions are civil.
G.P.L.

ATTORNEYS-ADvERTISING-LAw FIRM NAMES MAY ONLY INCLUDE
NAMES OF LICENSED NEW JERSEY ATTORNEYS-In re Opinion 475

of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 89 N.J. 74,
444 A.2d 1092 (1982).
Jacoby & Meyers is a law partnership with offices in California
and New York. Neither Jacoby nor Meyers is licensed to practice in
New Jersey. In September 1980, the firm requested an opinion from
the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics on the
feasibility of opening branch offices in New Jersey under the name
Jacoby & Meyers. 89 N.J. at 79, 444 A.2d at 1094. The Committee
ruled that DR 2-102(c) prohibited use of the name Jacoby & Meyers
because the rule requires that all persons listed in a New Jersey law
firm must be licensed to practice in New Jersey. Jacoby & Meyers
petitioned the supreme court under N.J. CT. R. 1:19-8 for a review of
the Committee's opinion, id. at 80, 444 A.2d at 1095, arguing that DR
2-102(c) violated the first amendment, commerce clause, privilege
and immunities clause and the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 82, 444 A.2d at 1096.
The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Pashman, ruled that
DR 2-102(c) had been correctly applied to Jacoby & Meyers and did
not violate any of the petitioner's constitutional rights. The court,
however, did hold that the rule should be submitted to the Supreme
Court Committee for evaluation of its ban on the use of unlicensed
attorney's names used in advertising and the ban on television advertising for attorneys. Id. at 78, 444 A.2d at 1094.
The court initially addressed the issue of standing. Id. at 80, 444
A.2d at 1095. While recognizing that limitations on the Advisory
Committee's original jurisdiction to inquiries from New Jersey lawyers
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would require dismissal of the petition for review, the court noted that
N.J. CT. R. 1:1-2 allows the court a degree of flexibility in order to
prevent injustice. The court, therefore, decided to hear the petition
and held that the petitioners who were seeking to do business in the
state, were considered "proper person[s] in interest," 89 N.J. at 81,
444 A.2d at 1095, as defined in Higgins v. Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics, 73 N.J. 123, 373 A.2d 372 (1977).
Each of the petitioner's allegations was considered separately by
the court. Justice Pashman dismissed the contention that DR 2-102(c)
violated the first amendment guarantee of free speech. 89 N.J. at 88,
444 A.2d at 1098. Viewing the issue as one of "commercial speech and
nothing more," id., the court reviewed recent United States Supreme
Court cases in the area, particularly concerning the use of trade
names. Given their emphasis on avoiding the conveyance of potentially misleading information, the court concluded that DR 2-102(c)
was a valid restriction because use of the name Jacoby & Meyers
would deceive the public into believing that petitioners were New
Jersey attorneys. The opinion also noted that law firm names are
official designations and, as such, are subject to stricter regulations
than ordinary advertising. Id. at 86-87, 444 A.2d at 1097. Moreover,
the court refused to allow the petitioner to associate its name with a
New Jersey law firm, explaining that petitioner's use of television
advertising, which may be seen in New Jersey, would give the associated New Jersey firm an unfair advantage because other New Jersey
law firms are not allowed to use television advertising. Id. at 89, 444
A.2d at 1099.
Petitioner's second claim alleged that DR 2-102(c) violates the
commerce clause because it is unduly burdensome on interstate legal
services. Id. at 90, 444 A.2d at 1100. Consideration of established
constitutional standards led the court to conclude that DR 2-102(c) is
not a "protectionist" measure, but instead it regulates a legitimate
state interest in the prevention of deceptive legal practices. Id. at 91,
444 A.2d at 1100-01. Similarly, the court refused to accept petitioner's
argument that the rule violates the privileges and immunities clause
since the right to use a specific law firm name is not a fundamental
right. Id. at 93, 444 A.2d at 1102.
The court also rejected the allegation that DR 2-102(c) violates
the equal protection clause by distinguishing between firm names
containing deceased or retired partners and firm names containing
lawyers not licensed to practice in New Jersey. If a state regulation
neither infringes upon a fundamental right nor burdens a suspect
class, the court stated, it does not violate the equal protection clause.
Id. at 94, 444 A.2d at 1102-03. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to
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persuade the court that the distinction bore no rational relation to the
goal of protecting prospective clients.
Justice Handler's concurring opinion criticized the majority for
addressing the issue of television advertising, finding the record "too
slim" to determine whether petitioner's New York advertising would
give a potential New Jersey affiliate an unfair trade advantage. Id. at
99-100, 444 A.2d at 1105 (Handler, J., concurring). He stressed that
the real issue was whether unlicensed New Jersey attorneys should be
permitted to open a New Jersey law firm in their name. In his opinion, the issue of television advertising was too speculative and should
have been reserved for a future decision. Id. at 97-98, 444 A.2d at
1104 (Handler, J., concurring).
The court is clearly correct in its interpretation of DR 2-102(c)'s
language. The court's decision to submit the rule to the Supreme
Court Committee for review indicates a possible shift in rules on
attorney advertising. Depending on the Committee's report, there
could be a dramatic change in the forms of advertising available to
New Jersey law firms.
L.A.C.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LABOR

LAW-NEW JERSEY STRIKEBREAK-

NLRA AND MODIFIED
COMMERCE CLAUSE-U.S.A. Chamber of Com-

ERS' ACT VALID WHEN NOT PREEMPTED BY

To CONFORM

TO

merce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353 (1982).
The United States and N~w Jersey Chambers of Commerce
brought this action in the superior court against the Attorney General
and State of New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment that the New
Jersey Strikebreakers' Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13C-1 to -6 (West
1965), was unconstitutional. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-1 prohibits
the supplying of out-of-state workers for employment in New Jersey to
replace employees who are lawfully striking or locked out. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:13C-2 prohibits the recruitment of replacement employees
for an industry marked by a strike or lockout by any person not
directly involved in the activity. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-3 prohibits
referral of applicants to employers whose employees are on strike or
locked out by state-licensed agencies aware of such activities. 89 N.J.
at 149, 445 A.2d at 362. In addition, the Act generally proscribes any
violent interference with lawful employer-employee bargaining.
The plaintiffs contended that federal labor law preempted New
Jersey's regulatory scheme under the supremacy clause of the Federal
Constitution. Id. at 138, 445 A.2d at 356. They also maintained that
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the Act violated the commerce, due process, equal protection, and
privileges and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution as well
as the equal protection and due process clauses and additional legislative provisions of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 138-39, 445 A.2d
at 356. In filing his answer, the Attorney General acknowledged that
commerce clause and preemption questions existed, but denied that
any other constitutional provision was violated.
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based upon a stipulation in lieu of discovery, agreed upon by the parties. Subsequently,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13C-1(c), :13C-2, and :13C-3 were declared
unconstitutional by the trial court. Those provisions of the Act dealing
with employees or employers covered under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976 & Supp. 1979) (NLRA), were
found to be preempted by the supremacy clause, and thus invalidated.
These provisions were also declared void for violating the equal protection and due process clauses. The New Jersey AFL-CIO then intervened as amicus curiae in the Attorney General's appeal. Before a
decision was rendered by the appellate division, the supreme court
granted plaintiffs' motion for direct certification. 89 N.J. at 139, 445
A.2d at 356-57.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Schreiber noted at the
outset that plaintiffs had standing to bring the action under the Declaratory Judgments Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:16-50 to -62 (West
1952), as organizations whose members had been subject to criminal
complaints under the Strikebreakers' Act. 89 N.J. at 141, 445 A.2d at
357. Turning next to whether Congress intended to preempt the subject matter of the Strikebreakers' Act, the court asserted that exclusive
federal jurisdiction had not been expressly reserved in the field of
labor relations by the NLRA. Id. at 142, 445 A.2d at 359. However,
after examining various guidelines for determining whether state regulation interferes with the federal scheme and whether the activity
sought to be regulated by the state is a matter of local concern, the
court indicated the judicial consensus that state legislation "that affects the economic balance between labor and management" is presumptively invalid. Id. at 143-48, 445 A.2d at 359-72. Since the power
to replace striking or locked out workers was considered to be directly
related to that balance, the Strikebreakers' Act, with its focus on labor
relations and not local concerns, was preempted by federal legislation
enabling employers to hire replacements for striking employees. Id. at
148-49, 445 A.2d at 362. In reply to the defendant's argument that the
legislation could be validated by limiting its application to situations
of potential violence, a matter of local concern, id. at 151, 445 A.2d at
363, the court declined to impute to the legislature a desire to have the
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Act survive in a "truncated fashion." Id. at 153, 445 A.2d at 364. The
court did agree, however, that the Act was valid as applied to employers and employees not covered by the NLRA. Id. at 154, 445 A.2d at
365.
With respect to non-NLRA related situations, the court held that
the statute satisfied the due process and equal protection clauses by
accomplishing its legislative objectives in an arguably rational manner. Id. at 157, 159, 445 A.2d at 366, 368. Justice Schreiber noted,
however, that the phrase "to supply from without the State" would
have to be removed from subsection 13C-1(c) to avoid violating the
commerce clause. Id. at 162, 445 A.2d at 369. Otherwise, the statute
would discriminate against interstate commerce since its prohibitions
applied exclusively to the supplying of out-of-state workers by individuals outside New Jersey. In this respect, the Act placed barriers across
the national labor market, thus frustrating the concept of a "national
free trade zone." Id. at 162, 445 A.2d at 369. Furthermore, the court
reasoned that the state had failed to justify the statute's impact upon
interstate commerce when compared to potential local benefits, and
had failed to show that nondiscriminatory alternatives were unavailable. Id. at 163, 445 A.2d at 369. Asserting that the legislature could
be deemed to have intended to regulate the supplying of out-of-state
workers by persons both within and outside New Jersey, the court
held that the excision of the objectionable phrase would insulate the
Act from attack as a violation of the commerce and privileges and
immunities clauses. Thus, it was concluded that sections 13C-2 and
13C-3 were valid in those situations not covered by the NLRA and
subsection 13C-1(c) would become valid upon the removal of the
phrase "to supply from without the State." Ud, at 163, 445 A.2d at
370.
In upholding the preeminence of federal policy in the extensive
employment field covered by the NLRA, the court has reduced the
impact of the "strong pro-labor bill" adopted by the legislature. Additionally, in narrowing the statute to conform to the commerce clause,
the court has diminished those benefits received from the measure by
New Jersey's labor groups. The practical significance of these changes
remains to be seen.
J.G.G.
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AGAINST

NOT LIMITED TO SEVERE PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS

To

ACT REASONABLY WHEN DENYING

OTHERWISE QUALIFIED APPLICANTS EMPLOYMENT-Andersen v.

Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483, 446 A.2d 486 (1982).
In 1960, Leif F. Andersen, the complainant, underwent a spinal
fusion and removal of a lumbar disc due to a serious back and spine
malady. 89 N.J. at 494, 446 A.2d at 489. Some 13 years later Andersen
sought the position of a night-time nonregular heating oil driver with
the Exxon Company, U.S.A. (Exxon). The job entailed various physical chores including the loading of an oil truck twice a night with
approximately 3000 gallons of heating oil. This required the maneuvering of a "spring loaded" filler mechanism which weighed 50 to 60
pounds. After filling the tanker, Andersen would have to make 25 to
30 deliveries and at each stop would drag a hose an average of 70 to 80
feet from the truck to the fill location. Id. at 488-89, 446 A.2d at 48889.
Upon reviewing the complainant's application, Exxon's personnel
manager mentioned to Andersen that the position would probably be
his upon successful completion of a physical examination. An allegedly cursory checkup was conducted by Dr. Joseph Buteras, a private
physician. Learning of the complainant's medical history, Dr. Buteras
failed to inquire further into any possible physical limitations and did
not conduct any extensive testing. The doctor's report recommended
that Andersen not be hired. This opinion was supported by Dr. Ira
Langdon, Exxon's regular medical doctor, even though he never spoke
with Dr. Buteras or personally examined the complainant. Thus, due
to his physical handicap, Andersen was denied employment. Id. at
489-90, 446 A.2d at 489.
In January of 1974 a charge of employment discrimination was
filed with the Division on Civil Rights and a probable cause determination was entered on December 27, 1976. At a subsequent hearing,
with an administrative law judge presiding, it was concluded that
Andersen was indeed physically handicapped within the meaning of
the pertinent statute and, being otherwise qualified, had been victimized by employment discrimination merely because of his physical
handicap. Id. at 490, 446 A.2d at 489. This decision was adopted by
the Director of the Division on Civil Rights and later affirmed by the
appellate division on Exxon's appeal. Id. at 491, 446 A.2d at 490.
Certification was granted upon defendant's petition. 87 N.J. 373, 434
A.2d 1059 (1981).
Faced for the first time with the application of the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West
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1976), in the context of the physically handicapped, the supreme court
was presented three basic issues: First, how does the Act define a
physical handicap; second, what criteria are utilized in measuring the
reasonableness of an employer's decision that the particular handicap
will prevent that person from efficiently performing the job's obligations; and third, what is the appropriate assignment of the burden of
proof in such cases. 89 N.J. at 488, 446 A.2d at 488.
Accenting New Jersey's intolerance for employment discrimination, the court made reference to the approach implemented in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for determining methods of unlawful discrimination. 89 N.J. at 491-92, 446 A.2d
at 494. Briefly stated, a prima facie case of discrimination is established if the complainant shows that he is a member of the class
intended to be protected by the statute, possessed sufficient skills for
the job available, was not hired, and the position remained available
while the employer sought other similarly qualified applicants. Id. at
492, 446 A.2d at 494. The satisfaction of these criteria effectively
shifts the burden of going forward, but not the ultimate burden of
proof, to the employer. While approving the use of the McDonnell
Douglas criteria, the court noted that in physical handicap cases
where both the discrimination and the reason therefore are generally
acknowledged, the central inquiry will relate to the reasonableness of
the employer's decision under the particular circumstances.
Starting from the premise that Andersen was indeed physically
handicapped within the meaning of the Act since its coverage is not
limited to cases of "severe disabilities," id. at 495, 446 A.2d at 492, the
court asserted that where it is obvious that the crux of the controversy
involves physical qualifications the complainant must demonstrate
that he was capable of fulfilling both the technical and physical
demands of the position sought. Id. at 499, 446 A.2d at 494. Once this
is accomplished it becomes the employer's duty to assert the affirmative defense that the nature and extent of the handicap reasonably
preclude his performances of the particular employment. Id. at 499500, 446 A.2d at 494. Thus, the reasonableness of the employer's
action is examined. It was also noted that the Act did not intend to
bind the hands of the employer. If the defendant can produce evidence which supports the claim that the actions taken were reasonable, given that the applicant rejected was truly unable to do the job,
the court will not "second guess" the employer. Id. at 496, 446 A.2d at
494-95.
Concluding that the appropriate standards were correctly applied in the prior decisions, the court stated that Exxon had acted
unreasonably. Reliance on an examination which failed to indicate
the applicant's capabilities or limitations, or any testing to that effect,
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was clearly inappropriate. Id. at 497-98, 446 A.2d at 495. Pursuant to
this determination the supreme court rejected Exxon's claim that such
a decision would impose absolute liability upon employers for relying
on a doctor's mistaken judgment. It was further stated that the cease
and desist order against the defendant's manager was appropriate
since he was the individual who directly refused to hire complainant
and was thus a participant in the discrimination. The $500 damage
award predicated on an emotional distress claim was also appropriate
in view of the remedial nature of the legislation.
Justice Schreiber dissented, finding that an employer who lacks
the knowledge to recognize the adequacy of medical testing should not
be charged with discriminatory conduct for relying in good faith on
the opinion of an independent medical expert. The dissent argued,
moreover, that the cease and desist order should not have been issued
against the personnel manager who was merely administering company policy. Finally, the dissent found no basis for the damage award
for emotional distress. Id. at 503, 446 A.2d at 496 (Schreiber, J.,
dissenting).
The remainder of the dissenting opinion analyzed the burden of
proof issue. Justice Schreiber contended that the majority had shifted
the burden of proof to the employer contrary to the well-settled
principles in this area. Id. at 504-05, 446 A.2d at 497 (Schreiber, J.,
dissenting). By requiring the employer to demonstrate that it acted
reasonably when concluding that the physical handicap would interfere with the job's performance, the court has in effect relieved the
complainant from showing the existence of a wrongful intent since
reasonableness is interrelated with the intent issue. Id. at 505, 446
A.2d at 497 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). This led the dissent to conclude
that the complainant must meet all of the McDonnell Douglas criteria
and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that intentional discrimination existed. Id. at 507, 446 A.2d at 498 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). In view of the constant physical exertion required by a nighttime nonregular heating oil driver coupled with an absence of
evidence to indicate discriminatory intent on the part of the examining physicians, the dissent concluded that the evidence supported
Exxon's acts as reasonable. Id. at 508, 446 A.2d at 500 (Schreiber, J.,
dissenting).
capped equal employment opportunities. By appropriately allocating
the burden of producing evidence, the majority requires that an employer act reasonably when dealing with a handicapped individual.
In so doing, the court added to the employer's existing responsibilities
by encouraging communication with the examining physician. "Our
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holding requires that an employer carefully inform its doctors of the
requirements for the job and review itself any recommendations of
disqualifications." Id. at 502, 446 A.2d at 495.
E.A.Z.

CRIMINAL LAW--ROBBERY--SIMULATED USE OF HANDGUN IN ROBBERY IS SECOND DEGREE CRIME-State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 445
A.2d 399 (1982).
On December 24, 1979, Irby Butler stole a woman's purse by
pretending to be concealing a handgun. 89 N.J. at 223, 445 A.2d at
400. Although he was unarmed, Butler's victim thought that he was
holding a weapon in his pocket.
During a 1980 plea bargaining session resulting from his arrest on
unrelated charges, Butler pleaded guilty to the 1979 robbery. Id., 445
A.2d at 400-01. The state dismissed other charges and endorsed a
twelve year maximum aggregate sentence. Id., 445 A.2d at 401.
Butler was subsequently convicted of first degree robbery and sentenced to a twelve year term.
After Butler's motion for reduction of sentence was denied, he
petitioned for a review of his case, arguing that the simulated use of a
weapon during a robbery was a second degree crime punishable by a
five to ten year term, not a first degree crime punishable by a ten to
twenty year term. Id. at 223-24, 445 A.2d at 401. The appellate
division found that the crime Butler committed was first degree robbery and, therefore, affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. at 224,
445 A.2d at 401.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted Butler's petition for
certification. In a five to two decision, the court overturned the
appellate division's decision, rescinded the first degree robbery conviction, and remanded the case so that a second degree robbery conviction and a ten year sentence could be prescribed. The court held that
Butler's sentence should be reduced because he did not have a deadly
weapon in his possession when he committed the crime. Id. at 231,
445 A.2d at 405.
Justice Handler, writing for the majority, observed initially that
in spite of his plea of guilty, Butler had the right to object to the
factual foundation of his plea on appeal. Id. at 224, 445 A.2d at 401.
Having surmounted this procedural obstacle, the court then identified
two possible constructions of the phrase "threaten the immediate use
of a deadly weapon" in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1(b) (West Supp.
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1982): Either the robber must really have a dangerous weapon with
him or he must seem to be carrying such a weapon when he menaces
his victim. 89 N.J. at 226-27, 445 A.2d at 402. Although confident
that requiring actual possession of a weapon was intended by the
legislature, the majority searched for additional support for this view
outside the plain meaning of the words of the statute. Id. at 227,
445 A.2d at 402.
The court initially scrutinized the commentary to the specific
provision of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice in question. Id.
at 227-28, 445 A.2d at 402-03. Justice Handler noted that the Code's
commentary identified the simulated use of a weapon as a second
degree offense, as distinguished from the real possession and use of a
weapon, a first degree offense. Id. at 227, 445 A.2d at 402-03. The
majority also compared the New Jersey Code to the Model Penal Code
and the New York Penal Law, and reasoned that the objective approach used by these two in determining the degree of an offense was
also intended by the legislature to apply to the New Jersey Code. Id.
at 227-28, 445 A.2d at 403.
Justice Handler then explored the provisions of the New Jersey
Code as a whole. Id. at 228-30, 445 A.2d at 403-04. Through his
examination of the wording of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1(b), the
definition of "deadly weapon'.' set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:111(d) and its recent expansion by the legislature, and the lack of express
subjective language in the New Jersey Criminal Code in general, the
justice discovered an intent to require actual possession of a weapon
for a first degree robbery. The court also found an intent to focus on
the objective harm to the victim rather than the subjective fear of that
harm. Id., 445 A.2d at 403-04. The majority disapproved of the
appellate division's analysis of the "Rules of Construction" of the code
as requiring strict agreement with prior criminal statutes, by suggesting that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1(b) was evidence of a "fresh
approach" to the problem of theft with a dangerous weapon and that
the legislature's differentiation between robbery with and without a
deadly weapon was clear evidence of this "new formulation." Id. at
230, 445 A.2d at 404.
The majority concluded by deciding that the legislature could
reasonably have intended a more onerous punishment for robbery
with a dangerous weapon, since the hazard to the public would be
substantially greater than robbery without a weapon. Id. at 231, 445
A.2d at 404. Consequently, the court decided that the lack of actual
possession of a deadly weapon in Butler's case required the reduction
of his conviction from first to second degree robbery and the reduction
of his sentence from twelve to ten years. Id., 445 A.2d at 405.
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Justice Pashman, joined by Justice O'Hern, filed a dissenting
opinion. He would have affirmed the appellate division's judgment
primarily for the rationale expressed in that opinion. Id. at 432, 445
A.2d at 405 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted three
specific areas of disagreement with the majority. Id. at 432-33, 445
A.2d at 405-06 (Pashman, J., dissenting). First, Justice Pashman disputed the majority's interpretation of the recent amendment of the
definition of a "deadly weapon" as an expansion of the term, by
reasoning that the rapidity of the change showed that the legislature
did not want to limit first degree robbery convictions to those perpetrated with an actual weapon and that a "clean break" with prior law
had failed to materialize. Id., 445 A.2d at 405 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Second, the dissent challenged the majority's comparison of the
Model Penal Code and the New York Penal Law with the New Jersey
Code, by pointing out the significant ways in which they differ. Id. at
233, 445 A.2d at 405-06 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice
Pashman maintained that a robbery in which a simulated weapon is
used is not less serious than one in which a real weapon is utilized,
because the victim feels the same amount of apprehension and the
result is likely to be equally destructive. Id., 445 A.2d at 406
(Pashman, J., dissenting).
The supreme court reduced Butler's sentence because his simulated use of a deadly weapon was not a first degree crime under
existing New Jersey law. Butler's conduct, however, would certainly
constitute first degree robbery after the 1982 New Jersey Code amendment. Despite its limited practical application, the decision clearly
illustrates how the courts and the legislature interact when defining
and modifying the parameters of the New Jersey Code of Criminal
Justice.
L.R.G.

JUVENILE

COURTS-JURISDICTION-JUVENILE

COURT REFUSING

To

WAIVE JURISDICTION MUST STRIKE BALANCE BETWEEN PROTECTING
PUBLIC AND ENCOURAGING REHABILITATION-State

in re C.A.H.

& B.A.R., 89 N.J. 326, 446 A.2d 93 (1982).
Two juveniles, C.A.H. and B.A.R., along with an adult,
Edward Margie, set out to rob convenience stores in Middlesex
County. One of the juveniles, C.A.H., who was just under the age of
seventeen, brought a loaded gun. B.A.R., age seventeen, knew the
gun was loaded. The two juveniles stole a car and went to the convenience store with Margie, who committed armed robbery in the store
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with C.A.H.'s gun. The trio then went to another convenience store in
the same county. This time B.A.R. entered the store with the gun and
demanded cash from the store clerk. When the clerk refused, B.A.R.
shot the clerk in the eye and killed him. While B.A.R. attempted to
empty the cash register, a customer entered the store, apparently
unaware of what was happening, but left when B.A.R. refused to
serve him. B.A.R., accompanied by Margie who had entered the
store, ran back to the car and joined C.A.H. The three left the scene
and subsequently destroyed the stolen car by setting it on fire on a
deserted road. C.A.H. and B.A.R. then stole another car and separated from Margie. The two juveniles were apprehended two months
later en route to Florida. The murder weapon was still in their
possession. 89 N.J. 326, 446 A.2d 93.
Juvenile complaints were filed against C.A.H. and B.A.R. for
crimes that would have amounted to armed robbery, automobile
theft, arson, and felony murder in an adult court. Id. at 328, 446 A.2d
at 94. The judge in the juvenile and domestic relations court first
considered the waiver statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48 (West Cum.
Supp. 1982-1983), which provides that a juvenile court may waive its
jurisdiction if the juvenile is over fourteen years old and has committed a particular type of crime. It further provides that waiver is
appropriate if it is necessary to protect society against the juvenile
prior to the time he reaches the age of twenty-one. The judge concluded that the offenders clearly met the first two criteria. She then
decided that on the basis of expert testimony, a reasonable prospect
for rehabilitation existed. Finally, the judge found that society would
be protected from the juveniles since they would receive an indeterminate-to-life sentence while undergoing rehabilitation. Id. at 330, 446
A.2d at 95.
The appellate division remanded the case to the juvenile judge,
finding that the lower court opinion lacked clarity as to whether due
weight had been given to public safety and the nature of the crime. In
particular, the appellate division found that reasonable prospects for
rehabilitation prior to the age of twenty-one are inconsistent with the
possibility of indeterminate-to-life sentences. On remand, the juvenile
court further elaborated on its previous determinations and included
findings concerning the detention facilities at the Juvenile Homicide
Unit at Yardville. Id. at 331, 446 A.2d at 95.
Despite the absence of specific findings as to the nature of the
crime and the public interest in deterrence, the appellate court this
time affirmed the juvenile court's decision to retain jurisdiction, noting that the opposite result would have occurred if the appellate court
had had original jurisdiction. The state then made a motion for leave
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to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The motion was
granted and the supreme court summarily reversed the lower court
decisions. The case was again heard in the supreme court upon the
juveniles' motion for reconsideration. Id. at 331, 446 A.2d at 96.
The court held that the juvenile court judge had not properly
decided the case because she failed to balance the prospect for juvenile
rehabilitation against the need for the protection of society. Id. at 344,
446 A.2d at 102. The court first focused on the juvenile court's failure
to properly interpret the meaning of the phrase "adequate protection
of the public" contained in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48(c). Since the
lower court apparently only considered physical protection from these
particular offenders, it failed to consider the protection afforded society through deterrence. Id. at 334, 446 A.2d at 97. The court found
that while punishment will certainly deter offenders from repeating
their criminal acts, it will also serve to deter potential offenders from
committing similar acts against the interests of society by reminding
them of the consequences involved. Id. at 334-35, 446 A.2d at 97. On
the more specific question of the role of deterrence in the juvenile
waiver context, the court noted that the goal of deterrence operates in
much the same way as it does in the sentencing of "adjudicated
offenders," namely to discourage future offenses of a serious, calculated and purposeful nature by juveniles through adult prosecution.
The potential for rehabilitation was the next issue upon which
the court focused. The juvenile court interpreted section 2A:4-48(c) to
mean that so long as some rehabilitative potential exists, its jurisdiction should not be waived. While the court conceded that such an
interpretation is not without merit, a better interpretation would be
one that required a balance between the potential for rehabilitation
and the need for individual and social deterrence. Id. at 339, 446 A.2d
at 100. The court further elaborated that the potential for rehabilitation should be considered in light of the individual's past record, his
background, and his experience. Id. at 343, 446 A.2d at 102. Applying
the balancing test to the facts before it, the court found that the need
for protection of society outweighed the possibility of rehabilitation.
The court therefore found a compelling need to direct the juvenile
court to waive jurisdiction. Id. at 346, 446 A.2d at 104.
Justice Handler, writing for the majority, set up a rather definitive test to be used by juvenile judges when considering the issue of
waiver. The court substantially removes the ambiguity inherent in the
statutory language by interpreting it in a rational, yet liberal manner.
The standard still allows the juvenile court judge flexibility when
making the determination by mandating that the individual offender's
record and background be reviewed when rehabilitation is consid-
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ered. The test, however, provides an analytical method through
which the interest of society may be protected against a juvenile
offender who has committed a serious crime and whose prospect for
rehabilitation, though possible, is unlikely.
J.C.
CONTROL-NOTICE To QUIT RETo INCREASE RENT FOR MONTH-TO-MONTH TENANTSHarry's Village, Inc. v. Egg Harbor Township, 89 N.J. 576, 446
A.2d 862 (1982).

LANDLORD-TENANT-RENT
QUIRED

On March 17, 1978, Harry's Village, Inc., the owner and operator of a mobil home park in Egg Harbor Township, applied for a rent
increase under a municipal rent control ordinance to compensate for
capital improvements. 89 N.J. at 580, 446 A.2d at 864. The Egg
Harbor Township Rent Review Board granted an increase on August
10, 1978. Harry's Village, although notifying the tenants of an approved increase as required by ordinance, brought suit charging that
the increase was insufficient and that the rent control ordinance was
unconstitutional. The tenants paid the increased amount but cautioned that they would not pay future increases unless preceded by a
valid notice to quit as required by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-16.1
(West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
The case was remanded to the local Board by the trial court and
further increases were granted on April 10, 1979. 89 N.J. at 580, 446
A.2d at 864. Appeal was taken again by the plaintiff, Harry's Village,
alleging arbitrary and capricious Board action and realleging the
unconstitutionality of the local rent control ordinance. Id. at 581, 446
A.2d at 864. It was further charged that the tenants were not complying with the rental increase. To the tenants' assertion that they did not
receive written notification of the Board's decision, as required by
ordinance, or notice to quit, the plaintiff responded that no written
opinion had been rendered by the Board and that a notice to quit was
unnecessary.
The court first directed that the Rent Review Board issue an
immediate written decision. Upbn receipt of the Board's decision, the
plaintiff sent a copy of the decision and a notice of the rental increases
to each tenant. Several days later the court held that the rent control
ordinance was constitutional. Finding that the Board acted arbitrarily, it also granted further rent increases. Id. at 581-82, 446 A.2d at
864-65. Finally, the court concluded, since the rent control ordinance gives tenants sufficient notice of the raise in rent, a notice to
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quit was not necessary. The increases were made retroactive to the
date of the second Board hearing. Id. at 582, 446 A.2d at 865.
On appeal taken by the tenants who paid the increase under
protest, the appellate division affirmed the increases but held that a
notice to quit was required prior to an increase. The court concluded
that the notice of rent increases served by Harry's Village was not
sufficient as a notice to quit as it did not terminate the tenancies on
their anniversary date and failed to demand possession by a certain
date. Because the notice was invalid, the rental increases never went
into effect.
Certification was granted by the supreme court. 87 N.J. 370, 434
A.2d 1058 (1981). The supreme court affirmed the appellate division's
ruling that a valid notice to quit is required for a rent increase to be
valid, but modified its decision as to whether a valid notice to quit had
indeed been served. 89 N.J. at 590, 446 A.2d at 869.
In requiring notice to quit, the court, in an opinion by Justice
Pollock, explained that the residents of Harry's Village are periodic,
month-to-month tenants whose tenancy continues in accordance with
its original terms until terminated by either party upon service of one
month's notice. Id. at 583, 446 A.2d at 865.
Rental increases may be accomplished by sending a notice to quit
terminating the original tenancy and a second notice offering a new
tenancy at the higher rate. Failure to provide notice to quit, renders
rent increases ineffective and a hold over by the tenant after valid
notice creates a new tenancy at the higher rate. One function of this
procedure is to provide sufficient time to tenants to consider the offer.
Id. at 584, 446 A.2d at 866. Mere notice of a request for rent increase,
required by the Egg Harbor ordinance, is insufficient to alert tenants
to the actual increase and does not afford the protections of a notice to
quit. Id. at 584-85, 446 A.2d at 866. Thus, although a rent increase
may, in fact, have been authorized, the court concluded that a valid
notice to quit is required to implement the increase.
The court differed from the appellate division in holding that the
initial notice given by Harry's Village was indeed sufficient. Id. at
585, 446 A.2d at 866. In this connection, the court noted that a valid
notice to quit must state the reason for termination, the status of the
parties as landlord and tenant, the date upon which the premises are
to be vacated, and the date upon which the right to possession terminates.
While the common law rule has been that the notice to quit must
terminate the tenancy on the exact anniversary date, id. at 586, 446
A.2d at 867, the supreme court concluded that a notice to quit will be
made effective on the first subsequent anniversary date if the landlord
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has substantially complied with the requirement of a notice to quit
but inadvertently failed to terminate on the precise anniversary date.
Id. at 587, 446 A.2d at 867. Thus, since the notice on May 24 demanded possession on June 27, the next anniversary date 30 days after
notice was received was July 1, the date on which the court found the
increase to have become effective.
The court next considered the propriety of the trial court's granting of a retroactive rent increase applied to the unique facts of the case
before it. Id. at 587, 446 A.2d at 867-68. The court had granted an
increase on June 9, 1977, but made it effective as of May 1, 1977, the
effective date of the Board's order. Typically, the increase would not
have been effective until August 1, 1979, the next anniversary date of
tenancy. Id. at 588, 446 A.2d at 868. By remaining at Harry's Village
after the May 24 notice, the court found the tenants to have impliedly
accepted the increase effective July 1. In so holding, the court noted
the inordinate delay in decision and the fact that Harry's Village was
unable to serve written notice of the Board's decision until the Board
was directed by court order to make such a written decision. Id. at
589, 446 A.2d at 868.
A period of four years elapsed since the initial rent increase
application and the tenants had paid the increase for three years.
Since the tenants knew before .the effective increase date of the raise,
the retroactive grant was not found to be inequitable. Id. at 590, 446
A.2d at 869.
Justice Pashman dissented on the issue of the court's retroactive
application of the rent increase. While agreeing that the increase
covered by the May 24 notice became effective July 1, id. at 591, 446
A.2d A.2d at 869 (Pashman, J., dissenting), Justice Pashman declared
that the notice requirement applied to increases granted by both a
Rent Review Board and a court alike. Id. at 591-92, 446 A.2d at 870
(Pashman, J., dissenting). Therefore, the court-ordered increase communicated by notice to the tenants on June 10 did not take effect until
August 1. Id. at 592, 446 A.2d at 870 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
Permitting the rent increases to become effective before the new
tenancies were created, he said, would frustrate the notice requirement and place tenants in a constant state of uncertainty as to
whether they had paid enough rent for any one month.
The significance of this opinion rests in its calculated attempt to
impose some order on what the court described as the "morass of
uncoordinated responses by the courts" id. at 582, 446 A.2d at 865, to
the problem of rent increases. The fact that the majority clearly
limited its holding to the facts before it, however, may indicate that
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this attempt to find broad solutions is not feasible. The retroactive
grant of the second rent increase is troublesome and seemingly at odds
with the court's intent to aid the tenants. In view of the peculiar facts
of the instant case, the court's holding may prove to be of only limited
import. It is most noteworthy for its careful approach to an area
deserving of attention and order.
L.M.

REAL ESTATE AGENTS AND BROKERS-CoMMISSIONS-BusiNESS BROKERS MAY RECORD
INVOLVING

TRANSFER

COMMISSION

ON

SALE OF BUSINESS

OF REAL ESTATE DESPITE LACK OF REAL

ESTATE LICENSE-Kazmer-Standish Consultants, Inc. v. Schoeffel Instruments Corp.; Stender v. Perma Clad Industries; and
Victor Henry Associates v. Perma-Clad Products, 89 N.J. 286,
445 A.2d 1149 (1982).

This New Jersey Supreme Court decision consolidated two cases
involving the same issue: whether a business broker may collect a
commission on the sale of a business that includes the sale of real estate
despite the prohibition in the Real Estate Broker's Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45:15-1 to -42 (West 1978), on the collection of commissions
from the sale of real estate by anyone other than a licensed real estate
broker.
In the first case, Kazmer-Standish, a business broker, claimed a
commission on the sale of the assets of Schoeffel, a New Jersey manufacturer of scientific instruments, to Kratos, a California corporation
alleging that it had introduced the two companies. 89 N.J. at 289, 445
A.2d at 1150. Although the sales agreement did not list separate values
for the assets, they included real estate valued in the deed at $375,000.
The total purchase price was $2.7 million. Kazmer-Standish did not
have a license to sell real estate in New Jersey. The appellate division
affirmed the trial court's denial of the claim for a commission. Id. at
289, 445 A.2d at 1150.
The second case involved a written agreement between a business
broker, Victor Henry Associates (VHA) and Perma-Clad Products
providing for the payment of a 10% brokerage commission to VHA
for the sale of Perma-Clad's assets. The agreement, as subsequently
amended by letter, listed the total value of the business as $305,709,
including real estate assets of $260,000 which were listed separately.
Like Kazmer-Standish, VHA did not have a license to sell real estate
in New Jersey. Although a sale was made, Perma-Clad and the buyer
circumvented the agreement with VHA, negotiated independently
and did not notify VHA of the sale. Id. at 289-90, 445 A.2d at 1150-
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51. Upon learning of the sale, VHA sued for 10% of the $243,000
purchase price and for damages for interference with its rights under
the contract. The trial court awarded VHA the commission and a jury
granted $2500 in punitive damages. Id. at 290, 445 A.2d at 1151. The
appellate division affirmed the award of the commission attributable
to the sale of personal property only. Id. at 288, 445 A.2d at 1150.
In reversing the appellate division in Kazmer-Standish and affirming the decision in Perma-Clad, the supreme court developed a
clear rule concerning a business broker's rights to a commission for a
sale of a business that includes real estate interests. The court began its
analysis with a discussion of the applicability of the Real Estate Broker's Act to business brokers. The Real Estate Broker's Act provides
that unlicensed brokers may not bring an action to recover a commission on the sale of real estate. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-9 (West Cum.
Supp. 1982-1983). Because of the lack of contrary indication in statutory language and legislative history, as well as the inherent differences between a sale of real estate and the sale of a business, the court
concluded that the Act, with its license requirements, does not apply
to business brokers. While under this construction, a business broker
would be entitled to a commission on the sale of personalty, the
former Court of Errors and Appeals ruled in Kenney v. PatersonMilk
& Cream Co., 110 N.J.L. 141, 164 A. 274 (1933) that the statute
applied to prohibit a business broker, who was not licensed to sell real
estate, from bringing an action for any commission on the sale of a
business that included real estate unless the commission agreement
expressly apportioned the commission between the personalty and the
realty. 89 N.J. at 291, 445 A.2d at 1151-52. The Kenney decision has
been the subject of extensive criticism for its failure to recognize the
class of persons intended to be protected by the Real Estate Broker's
Act, namely consumers. Nonetheless, it has become the majority rule
and has been interpreted as denying a commission to an unlicensed
broker on a sale of a business if any real estate interests are involved.
Id. at 291, 445 A.2d at 1151. A minority rule allows business brokers
to bring actions for commissions where real estate interests are involved even though the values of the different types of assets are not
listed separately in the brokerage agreement as required by Kenney.
There are restrictions, however. The New York rule allows recovery of
a commission on the transaction as a whole provided real property is
not the predominant feature of the sale. Mississippi, on the other
hand, allows recovery of only that portion of the commission attributable to personalty provided, again, that realty is not the dominant
feature. Id. at 293, 445 A.2d at 1152.
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The supreme court agreed that a business broker should indeed
be permitted to recover a commission on the personalty portion of a
transaction involving real estate interests, but found the foregoing
approaches inadequate because of their requirement that personalty
be the dominate feature. Id. at 294, 445 A.2d at 1153. The court
declared that while such commission is limited to the portion attributable to personalty, recovery is not dependent upon the separate listing
of realty and personalty values in an agreement or upon a showing
that the sale of real estate was not the predominant purpose of the
transaction. Id. at 293, 445 A.2d at 1152. The court reasoned that the
Kenney rule was too harsh in that it prevented legitimate claims by
honest brokers simply because they failed to specify different values
for different types of assets. Likewise, the court asserted that the
minority approaches would unfairly prohibit valid claims simply because the value of the real estate assets exceeded the value of the
personal assets. Id. at 294, 445 A.2d at 1153. The court believed its
approach to be "more equitable and reasonable," stating that "honest
brokers should not be deprived of a commission on the sale of personal
property that they have produced." Id.
This decision creates a new rule by borrowing the best and
eliminating the worst of two former approaches. It does indeed, as the
court believes, present the most equitable approach to the problem.
More importantly, it presents a more contemporary approach by
recognizing that the Real Estate Broker's Act, which was intended to
protect the consumer, should not apply to the sale of a business, which
involves more sophisticated consumers, and should not operate to
deprive an honest broker, dealing with knowledgeable clients, of a
deserved commission.
B.A.K.

TRIAL

PRACTICE-GOVERNMENT

IMMUNITY

AND

LIABILITY-

WHILE COURT MAY RAISE ISSUE OF GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY FOR
PAIN AND SUFFERING,
TION

CAUSED

SUA SPONTE RAISING OF ISSUE AFTER SUMMA-

DEFENDANT

UNFAIR

SURPRISE

AND

PREJUDICE-

Rivera v. Gerner, 89 N.J. 526, 446 A.2d 508 (1982).
On November 12, 1976, Fernandito Rivera, the seven year old
plaintiff, alighted from a blue van used as the Morris District's school
bus. The bus had stopped at an intersection and Fernandito was
crossing the road at the direction of the bus driver, defendant George
Marinaro. As Fernandito reached the center of the intersection, the
van started to turn right. 89 N.J. at 529, 446 A.2d at 509. Suddenly
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Fernandito turned left and crossed into the path of defendant Gerner,
who was attempting to overtake the van. Plaintiff was hit by Gerner's
car and suffered multiple injuries. He was hospitalized for almost
three months and had to learn to walk again, requiring crutches for a
period of time. As of his last doctor's visit before the trial, the physician concluded that a discrepancy in leg length would eventually be
diminished, causing no long-term functional impairment.
Plaintiff sued Gerner, Marinaro, and the Morris County School
District Board of Education. As affirmative defenses, Marinaro and
the School District asserted, among other things, that plaintiff had
been contributorily negligent and that the claim was barred by the
New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 12-3 (West
1982). 89 N.J. at 530, 446 A.2d at 510.
Many issues were covered during trial, but the statutory limitation on a public entity's liability for pain and suffering was brought up
for the first time by the trial judge when he charged the jury. Id. at
530-31, 446 A.2d at 511. Under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(d) (West
1982), damages for pain and suffering may not be awarded against a
public entity or employee unless medical expenses exceed $1000 and
the disfigurement or loss of bodily functions is permanent. Over objection of the plaintiff, whose medical expert had testified that plaintiff's
overall prognosis was good, the court directed special interrogatories
to the jury on the issue of permanent loss of bodily functions. The jury
found Gerner 15% negligent, Marinaro 10% negligent, the Board
75% negligent, and Fernandito not negligent. It awarded plaintiff
$50,000, of which $30,000 was for pain and suffering. In addition, the
jury found "no permanent loss of bodily function" as required by N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(d), thereby relieving Marinaro and the School
Board from that portion of the award attributable to pain and suffering. 89 N.J. at 531, 446 A.2d at 510. Thus, Gerner was liable for 70 %
of the total award since he was accountable for the entire amount of
the judgment for pain and suffering.
Gerner moved for a new trial, but the trial court denied the
motion because Gerner had not objected to the instruction dealing
with subsection 9-2(d) and because the New Jersey Tort Claims Act
could not be waived. Id. at 532, 446 A.2d at 510-11. Gerner appealed, claiming that subsection 9-2(d) had been waived by the defendants who had not specifically introduced it and that in any case, this
section of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, as well as N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 59:9-3 were unconstitutional. The appellate division affirmed the
lower court's decision and Gerner appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court which granted certification to consider the issues associ-
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ated with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(d). 89 N.J. at 532, 446 A.2d at
511.
Having summarized briefly the legislative history of the Tort
Claims Act and the policy behind it, the court addressed the constitutional challenge to subsection 9-2(d) and its unique monetary and
severity thresholds. Id. at 533-34, 446 A.2d at 511-12., It distinguished
Gerner's equal protection argument by ruling that he had not met his
burden of showing the lack of a rational relation between the provision and the state public policy of limiting governmental liability. The
court also held that there was no violation of due process since "the
legislature may reasonably grant injured plaintiffs the right to full
recovery from any of multiple tortfeasors," id. at 534-35, 446 A.2d at
512, even though one may be rendered disproportionately liable.
The court then addressed whether the defense of immunity had
been waived by defendant's failure to plead N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:92(d) specifically. It held that by asserting the Tort Claims Act generally as an affirmative defense, the defendant fairly put the plaintiff on
notice. 89 N.J. at 535, 446 A.2d at 512. The court stated that a defense
could be properly before the court, even though not specifically
pleaded, if the pleadings as amended could accommodate the legislative policy without the "substantial countervailing disadvantages to
the parties or the judicial system." Id. at 536, 446 A.2d at 513.
Consequently, the court found that the trial judge had properly raised
the issue on his own.
While recognizing that a defense may be considered before the
court although not specifically pleaded, the court pointed out that
timing may be a determining factor. In this connection, it emphasized
the necessity of avoiding prejudice or surprise. Id. at 537, 446 A.2d at
153. Noting that the parties had not given much consideration to the
extent of plaintiff's injuries, the court held that Gerner had indeed
been prejudiced by the introduction of the defense after summation.
Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the appellate division and
remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of permanent loss of
bodily function and permanent disfigurement. Id. at 538-39, 446 A.2d
at 514-15.
In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly reaffirmed
the validity of the doctrine of governmental immunity and left no
doubt about the constitutionality of the sections of the New Jersey
Tort Claims Act limiting a public entity's or employee's liability for
pain and suffering to cases of substantial injury.
N.B.
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INSURANCE-NoTICE OF DETERMINATION-

ENGLISH-LANGUAGE NOTICE OF BENEFIT DENIAL SATISFIES FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT FOR NON-ENGLISH

SPEAKING

UNEMPLOYMENT

INSURANCE

APPLICANTS-

Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1075 (1982).
In September 1979, appellant Zoila Alfonso claimed unemployment insurance benefits. 89 N.J. at 42, 444 A.2d at 1075. Eighteen days
later, she was served with a notice of determination stating that she was
being denied benefits and that she had seven days to appeal. Alfonso, a
Hispanic who neither reads nor writes English, had the notice translated ten days later and filed an appeal immediately. Id. at 42-43, 444
A.2d at 1075-76. The appeal tribunal of the Division of Employment
Security, Department of Labor and Industry, dismissed her appeal for
failure to comply with the seven day time limit under N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 43:21-6(b)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983), and the Division's
Board of Review affirmed. 89 N.J. at 43, 444 A.2d at 1076.
Alfonso argued that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as well as section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976), required that a notice of determination be
given "in a language that [claimants] can understand." 89 N.J. at 43,
444 A.2d at 1076. Addressing this assertion, the court referred to the
due process requirements for notice set forth in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and noted that the
critical question was whether the notice was such, under the particular circumstances, as to inform the parties concerned of the pendency
of the action and furnish them an opportunity to object. 89 N.J. at 44,
444 A.2d at 1076 (quoting id. at 314-15).
In the court's opinion, Alfonso's view of the state's due process
obligations would require notice in a language the claimant would
understand whenever the state knows that the claimant is not fluent in
English. Id. at 44, 444 A.2d at 1076. In this connection, the court
turned to a number of factually similar out-of-state cases in which the
courts rejected such an argument based on the theory that English is the
official language in the United States and that, moreover, there is a
significant state interest in the maintenance of the nation's single language system. The court approved their common theory that "in an
English-speaking country, requirements of 'reasonable notice' are satisfied when the notice is given in English." Id. at 45, 444 A.2d at 1077.
While the court expressed sympathy for the many problems confronting non-English-speaking people in the United States, it concluded that no requirement existed "under procedural due process
concepts" for notice such as that proposed by Alfonso. It drew a
distinction between what is desirable and "humanitarian," on the one
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hand, and what is mandated under the Constitution with respect to
notice requirements to foreign-language-speaking citizens, on the
other. Noting that the Division of Employment Security had taken a
number of steps to ensure that Spanish-speaking claimants were fully
informed of the disposition of their claims, the court stated that "the
decision to provide translation . . . was one that is best left to those

branches of government that can better assess the changing needs and
demands of both the non-English speaking population and the government agencies that provide the translation." Id. at 46, 444 A.2d at
1077. Thus the court held that the notice given to Alfonso "satisfied
the requirements of due process" and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In a dissent joined by Justice Pashman, Chief Justice Wilentz
stated that a state is required to provide a claimant notice in his or her
own language when the state is aware that the claimant is not fluent in
English. Id. at 48, 444 A.2d at 1078 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting). Such
notice, he explained, must be such as to "trigger inquiry or action that
will result in an appeal," id., unless the benefits of providing such
notice are outweighed by the burdens of doing so. Employing the
balancing test in Mullane referred to by the majority, the Chief Justice
found that benefits to claimants resulting from notice in their own
languages outweighed the burden on the state in terms of cost and
"continuing vigilance" because of the difficulty in obtaining an accurate translation and, further, because of the grave consequences resulting from the denial of rights involved where a claimant for one reason
or another does not obtain one in time to file a timely appeal. Id. at 52,
444 A.2d at 1080 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting). The dissent rested in part
upon a recognition of Spanish as a "quasi-official" language in the
United States due to the country's sizeable Spanish-speaking population
and Puerto Rico's unique status as a commonwealth. Id. at 56, 444
A.2d at 1083 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting). It noted, however, that the
requirement of foreign-language notice was not limited to Spanish. Id.
at 59, 444 A.2d at 1084 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting).
Notwithstanding the Chief Justice's dissenting views, the decision
of the Supreme Court is sound. If, as stated in Mullane, due process
requires that notice be reasonably calculated "under all the circumstances" to inform those interested that proceedings are taking place so
that they may have an opportunity to present their case, then resolution
of this constitutional question turns upon the proper interpretation of
the word "reasonable." The United States Constitution applies to the
entire nation and not only those sections with high concentrations of
non-English-speaking persons. The idea that official notice in English
from a state agency satisfies the concept of "due process" under the
Constitution is a cogent one, properly recognized in this case.

